"MEXICO'S JUDICIAL REFORM:
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, POPULAR ELECTION, AND IMPLEMENTATION
CHALLENGES"
On February 6th, 2024, the then president of Mexico Andrés Manuel López Obrador presented various proposals for constitutional reforms, including the judicial reform. The reform proposes the separation of the functions of the Judicial Branch into three bodies: a judicial administration body, a Judicial Discipline Tribunal, and a new configuration of the Supreme Court of Justice. Added to this is the most controversial part: the election of judicial officials in the Judicial Branch by popular vote. More than a year after the initial proposal, this document will outline the main content of the judicial reform (I) and the path of its implementation (II).
I MAIN
CONTENT OF THE JUDICIAL REFORM
The judicial Branch in Mexico needed a reform due to its lack of citizen trust, long standing flaws like nepotism, and the accumulation of power derived from the fact that the president of the Supreme Court was also in charge of the administration and discipline work. This is something that most stakeholders would agree on.
The Judicial Reform entered into force on September 16th, 2024, one day after its publication in the Official Journal of the Federation and created two new bodies: the judicial governing body and the Judicial Discipline Tribunal.
According to the Constitution, the “judicial governing body shall determine the number, division into circuits, territorial jurisdiction, and specialization by subject matter—including broadcasting, telecommunications, and economic competition—of the Circuit Collegiate Courts, Collegiate Appellate Courts, and District Courts." This body will be composed of 5 persons appointed by the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches.
The Judicial Discipline Tribunal will be composed of 5 persons elected by popular vote and their main function will be to "to penalize public officials who engage in acts or omissions contrary to the law, the administration of justice, or the principles of objectivity, impartiality, independence, professionalism, or excellence."
The functions currently performed by these two new bodies are presently handled by the Federal Judiciary Council, which ultimately reports to the President of the Supreme Court. The reform will establish that the three main functions of the Judicial Branch will be distributed among three separate bodies.
However, the most significant and controversial aspect of this reform is the election of judges by popular vote, and their campaign period has just begun.
II THE PATH
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM
With the implementation of the reform, a legal battle erupted in which judges aligned themselves with opposing sides, rendering decisions based on political allegiances rather than legal principles. In this contentious environment, “amparo” judges (those responsable for adjudicating constitutional rights claims) attempted to overturn the reform, while electoral judges worked to prevent these challenges from succeding. Ultimately, the case challenging the Judicial Reform reached the Supreme Court, but was dismissed because there were insufficient votes among the Justices to support constitutional review, so the reform prevails.
Later, the three branches of government called for candidates to participate through three “evaluation committees”, each appointed by a different branch of government. To date, this has been the weakest aspect of the process, as each evaluation committee established its own rules and failed to implement a rigorous academic screening process. In the final stage, candidates were selected through a lottery system (tómbola) with the stated purpose of avoiding direct nominations.
The candidates have now been selected and their campaigns have just begun, which will continue for two months. The National Electoral Institute is responsible for monitoring these restricted campaigns, where candidates cannot receive private or public funds. In simple terms, candidates can only publish their information online, speak in public squares, and attend events at universities, labor unions or NGOs, provided that all candidates have been invited to participate.
Is this a good reform? The initial premise one must take is that the Inter American Court of Human Rights has mentioned that “is not competent to specifically establish which is the best institutional design to guarantee judicial independence” (Inter American Court of Human Rights. Case of Chocrón Chocrón vs Venezuela, Judgment of July 1, 2011, par 95.) Furthermore, “there is no universal model for selection and appointment process” (Human Rights Council. Visit to the Plurinational State of Bolivia: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of judges and lawyers, 2022 (A/HRC/50/36/Add.1) par 77.)
The election of
judges by popular vote presents inherent risks but does not automatically
constitute a violation of human rights principles. The implementation process
thus far has revealed certain challenges that should be addressed in the
future, particularly the need for more rigorous examinations in the evaluation
committees. On the other hand, the robust public discussions regarding the role
of the Judicial Branch are positive for building public trust. However a
comprehensive analysis of the reform’s efficacy must await the completion of
the implementation process.